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With the rising number of divorces in today's society 2 and with the national
emphasis to resolve child custody disputes through alternative forms of dispute
resolution,3 the ability to hold arbitrators accountable for their actions within
settlement conferences is becoming a prevalent issue. Arbitrators and mediators,
commonly outside of the court's supervision, are now determining the best
interests of the child, a role traditionally reserved to the courts.4 This increase
of out-of-court settlements creates a need for certain standards which hold these
quasi-judicial officers responsible for their decisions and liable for their actions.
The court in Howard v. Drapkin addressed the latter concern and extended
absolute quasi-judicial immunity to an arbitrator involved in a child custody
dispute.
5
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The situation giving rise to this case was a family law dispute over custody
and visitation rights with respect to the minor son of plaintiff Vickie Howard and
her former husband, Robert. 6 In response to her son's allegations that he was
physically and sexually abused by the father, plaintiff initiated family law
proceedings in which she sought to have the father's visitation rights terminated.
7
1. 222 Cal. App. 3d 843, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1990).
2. See Comment, Child Custody Mediation: A Proposed Alternative to Litigation, 1989 J. Disp.
RESOL 139 n.1.
3. Schepard, Philbrick & Rabino, Ground Rules for Custody Mediation and Modification, 48 ALa.
L REv. 616, 663 (1984).
4. Philbrick, Agreements to Arbitrate Post-Divorce Custody Disputes, 18 COLUM. J.L & Soc.
PROBS. 419 (1985); Schepard, supra note 3, at 624.
5. Howard, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 859, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
6. Id. at 848, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
7. Id.
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In order to determine the best interest of their child, Ms. Howard and Robert
decided to hire defendant, Robin Drapkin, to arbitrate the dispute.
Vickie Howard and Robert hired defendant, a psychologist licensed by the
state of California, to evaluate Ms. Howard, Robert, and their nine-year-old
child.8 Such an evaluation was thought to be necessary due to the seriousness
of the child's allegations of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse. 9 The purpose
of the evaluation was to determine what future contact Robert would have with the
child, if any.
10
Prior to any judicial proceeding, the mother and father stipulated that
defendant would evaluate the facts and circumstances and subsequently render
non-binding findings and recommendations. 1' The stipulation agreement was
signed by Ms. Howard and Robert and by their respective attorneys in the
underlying action. 12 The family law judge did not require the stipulation,
participate in its drafting, or supervise defendant's work. 13 However, the court
eventually signed this stipulation and converted it into an order. 14 The purpose
of this order was to allow defendant adequate time to evaluate the feasibility of
terminating the father's visitation rights before the hearing to show cause was
held.15
After defendant held meetings in which she evaluated the child and the
father, a final evaluation meeting between plaintiff and defendant was scheduled
for the evening before the order to show cause hearing. 16 The meeting, which
defendant said would only last for an hour and a half, lasted over six hours-from
5:30 p.m. to 11:50 p.m.' During this meeting, plaintiff alleged that for five of
those six hours defendant personally attacked her, screamed at her, ridiculed her,
accused her of lying and fabricating evidence, threatened she would lose custody
of her son if she persisted in the custody dispute, and misrepresented that the
child's doctors and other experts involved in the case did not believe the child had
been abused. 18 Plaintiff claimed that defendant's purpose for the meeting was
to induce plaintiff to abandon her belief that Robert had abused their child.19
After the meetings, defendant prepared a report that plaintiff claimed to be
negligently prepared. 20 In this report, plaintiff alleged that defendant neglected
to state that a hospital examination of the child showed evidence of irritation of
8. Id. at 849, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 848, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
12. Id. at 849, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 848, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
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the child's genitalia, and the examining doctor's opinion that "[i]t seemed like
somebody had been chomping on his penis."21 In addition to omitting material
information, plaintiff claimed that defendant also failed to investigate certain other
relevant matters.
22
Finally, plaintiff asserted that defendant failed to disclose her lack of
expertise in the area of child abuse as well as sexual abuse, and also failed to
divulge that she and Robert had a prior professional relationship which consisted
of participation in professional seminars. 23 Plaintiff also claimed that defendant
failed to disclose that she was a close personal friend of the wife of one of the
partners in the law firm which represented Robert in the underlying action.24
As a result of these accusations, plaintiff's pleading set forth causes of action for
professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
infliction of emotional distress, and fraud.2 5
In response to plaintiff's second amended complaint, defendant filed a
general demurrer contending that she had quasi-judicial, quasi-arbitral and/or
arbitral immunity, as well as immunity as an expert witness.26 Defendant also
claimed entitlement to the "judicial proceeding" or litigation privilege set out in
California's Code of Civil Procedure section 47(2).27 The Superior Court of Los
Angeles County sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action. 28
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals for the Second District held that
absolute quasi-judicial immunity is properly extended to neutral third-parties, such
as family law arbitrators, for their conduct in performing dispute resolution
services which are connected to the judicial process and involve either (1) the
making of binding decisions, (2) the making of findings to the court, or (3) the
arbitration, mediation, conciliation, evaluation or other similar resolution of
pending disputes. 29
21. d.
22. Id. The court did not address defendant's failure to investigate these relevant matters and
therefore did not include them in the opinion.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 848, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
26. Id. at 849, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 859, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
1991]
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Judicial immunity 30 from civil liability is deeply rooted in English common
law.3 1 Judicial immunity has been "the settled doctrine of the English courts for
many centuries, and has never been denied ... in the courts of this country."
32
English courts have held, beyond all controversy, "that a judge of any court,
whether of limited or general jurisdiction, is not liable in a civil action for acts
done in his judicial capacity, and within his jurisdiction, even though it be alleged
that the acts complained of were done maliciously and corruptly."
33
In 1869, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of judicial
immunity for the first time in Randall v. Brigham.34 In Randall, the Court held
that judges of general jurisdiction courts were immune from civil suits, absent the
presence of corruption or malice, even when they acted outside their jurisdic-
tion.3 5 The reasoning of the Court rested upon public policy considerations
which sought to "preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary and to
insure that judges will act upon their convictions free from the apprehensions of
possible consequences."
36
Three years later in Bradley v. Fisher,37 the Supreme Court refined the
language used in Randall by enumerating five reasons for granting immunity to
judges: first, a judge must be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences; second, the controversiality and
importance of the competing interests in contest before a court make it likely that
the losing party will blame the judge for making the wrong decision under the
influence of improper motives; third, judges faced with the prospect of a law suit
would be driven to wasteful and inefficient self-protection measures, such as
excessive record keeping; fourth, alternative means of redress such as appeal and
impeachment replace the need of an action against the judge; fifth, the ease of
alleging "bad faith" would make qualified immunity based on "good faith"
virtually worthless.3 8 A sixth reason, the need for judgments to be final, can be
added to this list.
39
30. "Immunity exists for 'judicial' actions; those relating to a function normally performed by a
judge and where the parties understood they were dealing with the judge in his official capacity."
Olney v. Sacramento County Bar Ass'n, 212 Cal. App. 3d 807, 811, 260 Cal. Rptr. 842, 844 (1989).
"Here, immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to
whom it attaches." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988).
31. See Floyd v. Barker, 12 Co. Rep. 23, 15 Eng. R.C. 37; Scott v. Stansfield, LR. 3 Ex. 220, 15
Eng. R.C. 42.
32. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872). For a more thorough review of the
historical roots of judicial immunity, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 529-36 (1984).
33. Jones v. Brown, 6 N.W. 140, 142 (Iowa 1880).
34. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1869).
35. Id. at 536.
36. Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 254, 72 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Minn. 1955).
37. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335.
38. Id. at 347-54.
39. Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984 (1986).
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Originally, judicial immunity extended only to judges to assure their freedom
to execute their duties with independence and without fear of consequences.
40
However, the federal courts have granted quasi-judicial immunity to various other
public officials who are entitled to the same type of immunity from liability for
those acts performed while acting in their official capacities. 41 These courts
have extended quasi-judicial immunity to such public officials as the President,42
legislators,43 legislative aides, 44 prison administrators, 45 prosecutors, 4 hospi-
tal superintendents,47 school administrators, 48 child protective services work-
ers,49 psychologists and attorneys for children in child abuse actions, and
certain state executive officials.5 1 Additionally, in Butz v. Economou,52 the
Supreme Court extended judicial immunity to those who perform quasi-judicial
functions or those whose powers and purpose are "functionally comparable to that
of a judge."53 This grant of immunity "extends to quasi-judicial officials and
those so closely associated with the judicial process that their protection from
harassment is necessary in order to protect the judicial process."54
Courts recognized earl% on that the role of an arbitrator can be construed to
be quasi-judicial in nature. Since arbitrators by definition are neutral parties
and therefore have no interest in the outcome of the matter under consideration,
their purpose is "functionally comparable to a judge and, consequently, they are
clothed with an immunity that is analogous to judicial immunity." 56 Therefore,
arbitrators have been protected from civil suit under the doctrine of "arbitral
immunity."5 7 "The principle underlying the doctrine of arbitral immunity is the
same as that giving rise to the doctrine of judicial immunity: the protection of the
integrity of the decision-making process from reprisals by dissatisfied litigants.
5 8
40. International Union, United Auto. Workers v. Greyhound Lines, 701 F.2d 1181 (6th Cir.
1983).
41. Id. at 1185.
42. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
43. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
44. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
45. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
46. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
47. O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
48. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
49. Coverdell v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1987).
50. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1465-68 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828 (1987).
51. Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
52. 438 U.S. 478 (1977).
53. Id. at 513.
54. Cahn v. International Ladies' Garment Union, 203 F. Supp. 191, 193 (ED. Pa. 1962).
55. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344 (1854).
56. United Auto. Workers, 701 F.2d at 1185.
57. Corey v. New York Stock Exch., 493 F. Supp. 51, 55 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
58. id. at 56. See Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1977).
1991]
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
The critical part of the court's decision in Howard involved an extensive
review of common law immunity in California. The court traces the concept of
immunity from its roots in judicial immunity, as applied to judges, to the
application of quasi-judicial immunity, as applied to arbitrators in the present
case.59 In explaining the rationale behind the doctrine of judicial immunity, the
court provided two policy objectives: (1) "[to protect] the finality of judgments
and discourage[] inappropriate collateral attacks, " 6° and (2) "[to protect] judicial
independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by
disgruntled litigants."61 The court reasoned that the public is best served when
its judicial officers are free to discharge their duties without fear of personal
liability for acts performed in their judicial capacity. 62
After establishing the need for judicial immunity, the majority focused on
applying the concept of quasi-judicial immunity to persons other than judges. 63
The court recognized that California courts have extended judicial immunity from
civil suits to such persons as grand jurors,64 administrative law hearing offi-
cers, prosecutors, officials on the Committee of Bar Examiners,6 7 arbitra-
tors,68 and organizations sponsoring an arbitrator. 69 The Howard court agreed
with these other courts that in determining if the officer is truly judicial and thus
deserving of quasi-judicial immunity, then the appropriate focus is on the nature
of the duty performed. 70 The court also agreed that when a duty is found to be
quasi-judicial in nature, the granting of judicial immunity is necessary to promote
uninhibited and independent decision making.
71
After holding that it is the nature of the act, and not the name or
classification of the officer who performs it, which determines if an officer is
59. Howard, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 850, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 896-903.
60. Id. at 851, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 897 (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988)).
61. Id
62. Id.
63. Id. at 852, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
64. Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65, 69 (1880).
65. Taylor v. Mitzel, 82 Cal. App. 3d 665, 670-71, 147 Cal. Rptr. 323, 325-26 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978).
66. Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 284, 44 P.2d 592, 596 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
67. Greene v. Zank, 158 Cal. App. 3d 497, 497, 204 Cal. Rptr. 770, 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
68. Baar v. Tigerman, 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 985, 211 Cal. Rptr. 426, 430 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983);
Coopers & Lybrand v. Superior Court, 212 Cal. App. 3d 524, 534, 260 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719-20 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989).
69. Olney v. Sacramento County Bar Ass'n, 212 Cal. App. 3d 807, 814-15, 260 Cal. Rptr. 842,
844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
70. Howard, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 852, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
71. Id.
[Vol. 1991, No. 1
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deserving of judicial immunity, the court rationalized that the nature of the duty
is defined by its connection to the judicial process.72 This connection does not
have to be direct, as in the case of a public official, but it must be an integral part
of the judicial process so as to warrant protection from civil liability.73 Thus,
the majority found that nonjudicial persons who fulfill quasi-judicial functions
intimately related to the judicial process should have absolute immunity from civil
suits arising out of the performance of their duties in connection with the judicial
process.74 The court reasoned that absent such immunity, these persons would
be reluctant to accept court appointments or provide work product for the court's
use.
75
With the majority reasoning that certain nonjudicial persons are entitled to
quasi-judicial immunity, the last stage of the court's analysis turned to applying
this immunity to persons engaged in neutral dispute resolution. 76 The court first
noted the many benefits that alternative methods of dispute resolution convey upon
the judicial process. These benefits include relieving court congestion and
providing a less expensive and less stressful process of resolution. 7 ' The court
found that since these methods of resolution are becoming more relied upon, they
are critical to the proper functioning of our increasingly congested trial courts.
78
The court also notes that the functions of third parties such as arbitrators,
mediators, and evaluators involve impartiality and neutrality, very similar to that
of a judge, and therefore third parties should be entitled to the same immunity
given others who function as neutrals in an attempt to resolve disputes.79 The
court reasoned that "those persons are similar to a judge who is handling a
voluntary or mandatory settlement conference, no matter whether they are (1)
making a binding decision, 80 (2) making recommendations to the court,81 or
(3) privately attempting to settle disputes, such as the defendant here." 82
Therefore, the California Court of Appeals for the Second District held that
absolute quasi-judicial immunity is properly extended to neutral third-parties, such
as arbitrators, for their conduct in performing dispute resolution services which are
connected to the judicial process.83 Activities that qualify arbitrators for this
immunity are "(1) the making of binding decisions, (2) the making of findings or
72. Id.
73. Id. at 856, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
74. Id. at 857, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 858, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
77. Id. at 858, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 901-02.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. An example of this would be a referee acting pursuant to CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 638(1)
(West 1982).
81. An example of this would be a referee acting under CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 639 (West 1981)
or a mediator acting under CAL CIV. CODE § 4607 (West 1983).
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recommendations to the court or (3) the arbitration, mediation, conciliation,
evaluation or other similar resolution of pending disputes."
84
B. Statutory Privilege
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether defendant was protected from
tort liability by section 47(2) of the Civil Code of California, which governs
privilege.85 In deciding whether the privilege applied to defendant, the court
used a test outlined in Silberg v. Anderson.86 The Silberg court explained the
four-part test by stating "that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made
in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigant§ or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have
[sic] some connection or logical relation to the action."87 If all four of these
elements are found to describe the communication between defendant and plaintiff,
then defendant will be entitled to the statutory privilege.
88
In applying the test to the present case, the court found that plaintiff
conceded the existence of the second and fourth elements. 89  The court
concluded that since defendant was an invited, and ultimately court-approved,
participant in the matter and that since her communications were obviously related
to the issues in the dissolution action, namely custody and visitation, that the
communications were made by a participant in the litigation and that the findings
have some connection or logical relation to the case.
90
With respect to the first element of the test, whether the alleged wrongful
communications were made in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, plaintiff
argued that defendant's communications were "collateral" because they were not
made during the course of and as a part of the judicial proceeding. 9 1 The court
found no merit in this contention and relied on the Silberg court's analysis that the
section 47(2) privilege applies "even though the publication is made outside the
courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved."92
As for the third element of the test, whether the communication was made
to achieve the objects of the litigation, the court found this element was clearly
met.93  The court held that "defendant's alleged wrongful communications,
whether express or implied and whether screamed or simply stated, were 'not..
84. Id. at 860, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
85. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(2) (West Supp. 1990).
86. 50 Cal. 3d 205, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 786 P.2d 365 (1990).
87. Howard, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 861, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
88. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 220, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 647, 786 P.2d at 374.
89. Howard, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 863, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 861, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04 (quoting Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 212, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 642,
786 P.2d at 369).
93. Id. at 863, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
[Vol. 1991, No. 1
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. extraneous to the action' but rather had a 'logical relation' to it." 94  In
addressing the issue of defendant's motives, morals, ethics and intent, the court
found these traits not at issue when asking whether her acts were in furtherance
of the objects of the dissolution proceedings. 95 Therefore, the court concluded
that section 47(2)'s privilege protected defendant from her alleged wrongful
conduct.96
C. The Dissent
In the concurring and dissenting opinion, Associate Justice Danielson
concurred with the result reached in the decision, but rejected the majority's
reasoning and holding.97  Danielson stated that the majority opinion would
"create, by judicial legislation, a 'quasi-judicial immunity' in persons whom it
vaguely designates as 'neutral third party participants in the judicial process."' 98
Justice Danielson's view is that the majority has usurped the legislature's power
by extending judicial immunity to a person who would not otherwise enjoy it.99
Justice Danielson reasoned that evidence that the California Legislature granted
judicial immunity to arbitrators in 1985100 is indicative that the legislature has
properly addressed the issue and, that if there were a need to further extend
judicial immunity, the legislature would have met that need by similar legisla-
tion. 10 1 Therefore the dissent held that "profound changes in our laws, such as
the majority seek to make, should be forged in the proven and legitimate crucible
of the legislative process." 10
2
As mentioned above, Justice Danielson agrees with the result reached in the
case. The rationale for this concurrence is found in the justice's approval of the
majority's section 47(2) analysis. 103  According to Justice Danielson, the
statutory privilege provided in section 47(2) disposes of the issue fully, and that
disposition is based upon law enacted properly by the legislature. 10 4 However,
Justice Danielson does remind the majority that "section 47(2) does not confer
94. Id. at 863-64, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (quoting Silberg, 50 Cal.3d at 219-20, 266 Cal. Rptr. at
647, 786 P.2d at 374).
95. Id. at 864, 271 Cal. Rptr. 904.
96. ld.
97. Id. at 864, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 867, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
100. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1280.1 (West 1982).
101. Howard, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 867, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
102. Id. at 867, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 907-08.
103. Id. at 866, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
104. Id. at 865-66, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
1991]
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immunity on any person or class of persons, it is limited to reaching and
conferring a privilege on certain communications." 10 5
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
There are several policy reasons for bestowing upon arbitrators the shield of
quasi-judicial immunity. In Hoosac Tunnel Dock and Elevator Co. v. O'Bri-
en,1° 6 the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the same policy reasons that
protect judges through immunity are valid for arbitrators. The Court's reasoning
has often been quoted in arbitral immunity cases:
An arbitrator is a quasi judicial officer, under our laws, exercising
judicial functions. There is as much reason in his case for protecting
and insuring his impartiality, independence, and freedom from undue
influences, as in the case of a judge or juror. The same considerations
of public policy apply, and we are of opinion that the same immunity
extends to him.
10
In regard to insulating arbitrators from undue influences, especially from
dissatisfied parties, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Tamari v. Con-
rad10 8 reasoned that immunity was necessary because "individuals cannot be
expected to volunteer to arbitrate disputes if they can be caught up in the struggle
between the litigants and saddled with the burdens of defending a lawsuit."
10 9
This pronouncement was made earlier by a New York Superior court in Babylon
Milk & Cream Co. v. Horvitz.110 In this case, the court stated that arbitrators,
like other judicial officers, "must be free from the fear of reprisals by an
unsuccessful litigant. They must of necessity be uninfluenced by any fear of
consequences for their acts."
111
105. Id. at 908. The purpose of section 47(2) is to provide litigants and witnesses "the utmost
freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.'
Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d. at 214-17, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 642, 786 P.2d at 369 (1990). This is accomplished
by "encouraging 'open channels of communication and the presentation of evidence' in judicial
proceedings." Id. (quoting McClatchy Newspapers. Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 3d 961,970,
234 Cal. Rptr. 702, 707 (1987)). Therefore, the focus of section 47(2) is on the communications
between citizens and the public authorities who are responsible for the investigation and remedy of
wrongdoing, not upon the public authorities themselves.
106. 137 Mass. 424 (1884).
107. Id. at 426.
108. 552 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1977).
109. Id. at 780-81.
110. 151 N.Y.S.2d 221 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956), aft'd, 4 A.D.2d 777, 165 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1957).
111. Id. at 224.
[Vol. 1991, No. 1
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The arbitrator's fear of civil liability has been important to the rationale
behind granting quasi-judicial immunity. 112 But, it can be argued that quasi-
judicial immunity is improperly applied to arbitrators. Of the six original reasons
for granting judges immunity, only three could possibly be applied to arbitrators,
those reasons concerning the fear of liability, the likelihood of blaming the judge
for improper motives, and the ease of alleging "bad faith". 1 3 The other three
reasons not only are improperly applied to arbitrators but they are possible reasons
for not giving arbitrators immunity. The need to prevent judges faced with the
prospect of a law suit from being driven to wasteful and inefficient record keeping
is not applicable to arbitrators due to the desire that arbitrators should keep careful
and complete records of their evaluations. 114 This desire is especially justified
in child custody arbitrations where there is a need for careful determination of the
child's best interest. The other reasons for granting judicial immunity, such as the
existence of alternative means of redress which replace the need of an action
against the judge, and the need for finality of judgments, are simply not present
in the case of arbitrators. 115 Since many arbitrations are non-binding and not
an official part of the legal process, the need for finality of judgments and the
ability to appeal arbitral awards is non-existent.
Even if quasi-judicial immunity is properly applied to an arbitrator's actions,
at the very least the importance of the arbitrator's impartiality should not fall prey
to this immunity. The Howard court did not even address the competing interests
of the arbitrator's immunity and the arbitrator's impartiality. Impartiality was
included merely as just another function of an arbitrator that falls under the shield
of immunity. The importance of impartiality is exemplified in the Uniform
Arbitration Act, which provides for vacation of an arbitration award if a showing
of impartiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral can be made, or if there is
corruption on the part of an arbitrator, or if there is misconduct which serves to
prejudice the rights of a party. 16
Although defendant in Howard did not contest the arbitrator's award, she did
contest the arbitrators's abuse of her rights during the evaluation conference.
117
Thus, the conflict between the arbitrator's immunity and the client's right to a
neutral arbitrator is brought to the surface when the arbitrator's representation of
impartiality is contested as virtual fraud.
The court in Howard could have focused on the alleged abuse of the
arbitration process by defendant and thus come to the conclusion that defendant
was liable due to a violation of the client's right to an impartial arbitrator.
112. See generally Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988); Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d
1456 (6th Cir. 1984); Baar v. Tigerman. 140 Call. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr 834, 836 (Cal Ct. App.
1983).
113. Bradley, 80 U.S. at 354.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 12(aX2), 7 U.LA. 4 (1978).
117. Howard, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
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However, the court chose to focus on the broad granting of absolute immuni-
ty. 118 By allowing the defendant to avoid civil liability in the present case, the
court has skirted the issue of whether the defendant actually qualified for quasi-
judicial immunity. In order to qualify, the defendant must perform a duty which
is an integral part of the judicial process. 119 The duties performed by arbitra-
tors have been considered an integral part of the judicial process because
arbitrators have been viewed as neutral, unbiased parties who have no interest in
the outcome of the matter under consideration. This is exactly what plaintiff
claimed defendant was not: a neutral, unbiased party. Therefore, the real issue
that the Howard court needed to address was how an arbitrator accused of
impartiality can be considered an integral part of the judicial process.120
Arbitration as a method of dispute resolution derives its value from providing
the parties involved with a less expensive and less stressful alternative to litigation,
while still maintaining the neutrality of a court of law. 121 Some of the more
common reasons parties choose to arbitrate domestic relations disputes can be
found in the parties' fear of the formal legal system. 122 This apprehension can
be manifested as a fear that the judge does not have enough time for a thorough
examination of the case, a fear that the judge may be unable to relate to the
litigants, and a fear of the overall power of a judge, whom they have never met
and over whose selection they had little or no control. 123 Therefore, some
potential litigants may choose arbitration over litigation because it eliminates many
of these fears. By allowing such a broad and absolute immunity to all arbitrators,
regardless of possible abuses by an arbitrator, the court in Howard has created a
new list of fears for future litigants which might persuade them to take their
dispute to court where they perceive impartiality is more likely. As a result, the
Howard court's rationale of giving immunity to arbitrators in order to encourage
their participation 124 is completely without merit if in the end there are no
clients for these arbitrators to serve.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court in Howard which placed so much value upon the benefits of
alternative methods of dispute resolution, especially its ability to decongest a
crowded court system,12 5 has taken away much of arbitration's appeal to
possible litigants. By giving arbitrators absolute immunity, the court has taken
118. Id. at 850, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
119. Id. at 856, 271 Cal. Rpir. at 900.
120. Id. at 847-48, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
121. Philbrick, Agreements to Arbitrate Post-Divorce Custody Disputes, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 419, 443 (1985).
122. Meroney, Mediation and Arbitration of Separation and Divorce Agreements, 15 WAKE
FOREST L REv. 467, 469 (1979).
123. Id.
124. Howard, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 857, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
125. Id. at 858, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
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away part of the arbitrator's incentive to be totally impartial and has replaced it
with the ability to assert one party's claim over the other's. This result has
created a policy of protecting biased arbitrators while discouraging the use of
arbitration as an impartial dispute resolution alternative. In defending the
arbitration process by giving arbitrators a shield from liability, the Howard court
has, in fact, given arbitrators a sword with which to cut the bonds of impartiality,
allowing arbitrators to free themselves from the constraints that bind even judges.
ROBERT M. CARROLL
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